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ARTICLE 
 
The Case for an Information-Forcing 
Regulatory Definition of “Nanomaterials” 
DAVID A. DANA* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The definitional problem of nanomaterials—namely, what 
exactly are nanomaterials with regard to regulation—has 
attracted relatively little attention from academics.  Nonetheless, 
the definitional problem is certainly important: the scope of the 
definition or definitions may well dictate what uses of 
nanomaterials and risks from them come to be known by the 
public at all, and also may dictate how well regulatory agencies 
address risks once they are known.  More than that, the issues 
raised by the project of formulating regulatory definitions of 
nanomaterials are ones that are at the core of regulatory debates 
that extend far beyond nanomaterials, however defined.  If we 
“get it right” with nanomaterials, we thus may have a model for 
defining other emerging technologies. 
At first blush, however, the question of how we define 
nanomaterials for purposes of health, safety, and environmental 
regulatory regimes may seem like a hyper-technical question of 
limited interest, at least to non-scientists.  Consider, for example, 
a recent definition adopted by the Europe Commission: 
“Nanomaterial” means a natural, incidental or manufactured 
material containing particles, in an unbound state or as an 
aggregate or as an agglomerate and where, for 50% or more of 
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the particles in the number size distribution, one or more 
external dimensions is in the size range 1 nm – 100 nm.1 
This sentence that the European Commission put together is not 
exactly suggestive of anything interesting to a non-technical 
audience (or perhaps any audience).  But in reality, how we will 
and should define nanomaterials for regulatory purposes is not 
simply a technical matter.  It cannot be purely dictated by 
science, although it should be informed by it.  Rather, the 
definitional debate regarding nanomaterials has a great deal to 
do with the relationship between government and industry, the 
pervasive problem of how to manage uncertainty as to risk, and 
the need for institutional structures that can be stable enough to 
garner political legitimacy but that are nimble enough to evolve 
along with changes in technology and in the understanding of 
risks from technology.  In other words, the project of defining 
nanotechnology raises the same issues as regulation generally. 
This Article reviews regulatory attempts to define 
nanomaterials to date, including the European Commission’s 
definition.  It then sets forth and explains why agencies should 
adopt what I am calling an information-forcing definition of 
nanomaterials.  Nanomaterials implicate the same informational 
problem as many other substances or practices that are the 
subject of political and legal debate: that is, we (the public) know 
enough to know that there are some risks but not enough to 
specify and assess those risks.  We know risks are posed by some 
kinds of small-scale materials in some contexts, but not enough is 
known to define the universe of which particular materials pose 
risk and which do not (or how much risk is posed by those 
materials that do pose risk).  Regulators, therefore, do not know 
enough to specify the health and environmental risks from 
nanomaterials with any precision.  Regulatory definitions are, 
therefore, needed that facilitate the production and sharing by 
industry of information about the small-scale materials they use, 
why they use them, and what behaviors those materials exhibit 
that may translate into human health and/or ecological risk.  The 
 
 1. Commission Recommendation of 18 October 2011 on the Definition of 
Nanomaterial, 2011 O.J. (L 275) 38-40 [hereinafter Definition of Nanomaterial], 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 
32011H0696:EN:NOT . 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/3
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regulatory definitions should be structured so as not only to force 
information from industry, but also to force, or at least encourage, 
agencies not to give in to powerful forces of bureaucratic inertia 
and stick with regulatory definitions even after emerging science 
and other public information suggest they are obsolete. 
II. A DEFINITION THAT DOES NOT WORK: 
CHEMICAL IDENTITY 
It may be helpful to begin by addressing three terms: 
nanotechnology, nanoparticles, and nanomaterials.  
Nanotechnology generally refers to the industry involved in 
manufacturing or using nanomaterials in some way; the term 
encompasses both techniques to create and manage 
nanomaterials and nanomaterials themselves.2  Nanomaterials 
contain one or more nanoparticles.3  A nanoparticle is a single 
particle at the “nano” scale, which in the conventional scientific 
discourse, means that a particle has at least one external 
dimension that is less than one hundred nanometers in length.4  
A substance or material may consist of particles of different sizes, 
some arguably “nano” and others not.  One question is whether a 
material containing some nanoparticles (however defined) should 
be considered a nanomaterial, and when.  How much of a 
material has to consist of nanoparticles in order for it to be a 
nanomaterial?  And should it matter whether the nanoparticles 
are tightly bound to other particles, not that tightly bound, or 
essentially unbound? 
However one answers these questions, the definition of 
nanomaterial builds on the definition of nanoparticle, so an 
essential task is to define “nanoparticle.”  Again, for conventional 
scientific discourse, there is an answer—a particle with one 
dimension measuring less than one hundred nanometers in 
length.5  In other words, a particle with at least one very tiny 
 
 2. What Is Nanotechnology?, NANO.GOV, http://www.nano.gov/nanotech-
101/what/definition (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
 3. EUR. AGENCY FOR SAFETY & HEALTH AT WORK, WORKPLACE EXPOSURE TO 
NANOPARTICLES 7 (June 3, 2009), available at http://osha.europa.eu/en/ 
publications/literature_reviews/workplace_exposure_to_nanoparticles. 
 4. Id. at 13. 
 5. Id. 
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dimension.  However, the conventional scientific definition does 
not tell us what should be the regulatory definition.  To the 
extent we want particular regulatory attention to nanoparticles, 
or more broadly nanomaterials containing nanoparticles, we do 
not necessarily want to employ the conventional scientific 
definition unless that definition captures a category of materials 
that poses some particular risk. 
Nonetheless, the scientific literature does not make, let alone 
support, that claim.  Scientists use a conventional definition of 
nanoparticle simply as a descriptive convenience.  The scientific 
studies of nanoparticles (as per the conventional definition) 
suggest that some of them may have adverse health and 
environmental effects depending on the composition, size, shape, 
configuration, coating, and contextual application or use, as well 
as other factors that distinguish one nanoparticle or material 
from another.6  There is enough evidence to conclude that certain 
nanoparticles in certain contexts pose risks, but there is by no 
means evidence to suggest that most or all do.7  Moreover, even 
with respect to those nanomaterials that have received the most 
attention, such as certain carbon nanotubes, we have an 
incomplete characterization of the risks.8 
An initial response to the calls for regulatory attention to 
nanoparticles was to sidestep altogether the issue of definition 
and size and focus instead on the chemical identity of substances 
at the nanoscale.9  In this view, a nanoparticle or nanomaterial 
does not require attention as a new subject of regulatory inquiry 
as long as the molecular identity of the substances at the 
nanoscale is no different from that of other substances that have 
already been reviewed and essentially approved for unrestricted 
 
 6. Id. at 5. 
 7. See id. 
 8. For discussions of what is known and not known about nanomaterials, 
see Kimberly A. Gray, Five Myths About Nanotechnology in the Current Public 
Policy Debate, in THE NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE: CREATING LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS FOR UNCERTAIN RISKS (David A. Dana ed., 2011). 
 9. EUR. AGENCY FOR SAFETY & HEALTH AT WORK, supra note 3, at 49; see also 
U.S. EPA, TSCA INVENTORY STATUS OF NANOSCALE SUBSTANCES–GENERAL 
APPROACH (2008), available at http://epa.gov/oppt/nano/nmsp-inventorypaper 
2008.pdf. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/3
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use by regulators.10  For example, if a substance contains 
nanoparticles of silver, the substance would be considered 
unproblematic as long as non-nano (“bulk” or “coarse”) versions of 
substances made of silver have been deemed acceptable without 
regulatory restriction.11 
As an example of this approach, consider guidance offered by 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 
2008 regarding the status of “nanoscale substances” under the 
Toxic Substances Control Act: 
EPA has not used particle size to distinguish substances that are 
known to have the same molecular identity for the purposes of 
the TSCA Inventory.  In determining whether a nanoscale 
substance is a new or existing chemical, the Agency intends to 
continue to apply its current Inventory approaches based on 
molecular identity, rather than focus on physical attributes such 
as particle size. . . .  Although a nanoscale substance that has the 
same molecular identity as a non-nanoscale substance listed on 
the Inventory differs in particle size . . . EPA considers the two 
forms to be the same chemical substance because they have the 
same molecular identity.12 
While this approach had an obvious appeal to regulators 
seeking not to become entangled in the potentially very 
complicated regulatory project of dealing with nanomaterials, it 
meant that nothing would be done about nanoparticles that posed 
risks precisely because they were nanoscale materials.  The 
principal motivation behind the calls for regulatory frameworks 
for nanomaterials—and hence the need for a regulatory definition 
of nanomaterials—relates to the possibility that their small size 
may result in behavior that could pose a risk to human health or 
the environment.  As the report of the European Union’s Joint 
Research Center describes, there seem to be two distinct concerns 
related to size.13  One concern is that very small materials may be 
 
 10. TSCA INVENTORY STATUS, supra note 9. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Id. at 5-6. 
 13. See EUROPEAN UNION: JOINT RESEARCH CTR., CONSIDERATIONS ON A 
DEFINITION OF NANOMATERIAL FOR REGULATORY PURPOSES (2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_reference_report_201007_nanomaterial
s.pdf [hereinafter JRC REPORT]. 
5
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harmful simply because of where they may travel.14  The 
materials in very small form may be able to permeate barriers in 
the human body or other natural systems that were not designed 
to protect against such small materials, and these materials thus 
may enter into areas (such as the human brain) where they could 
cause harm.15  This concern does not appear to be inherently 
limited to materials that are one hundred nanometers or less, and 
could, depending on the context or environment in which the 
material would be introduced, be implicated by larger 
materials.16 
The second concern is that at very small sizes, the laws of 
physics apply to particles differently and hence very small 
particles can display novel properties that are not found in “bulk” 
or “coarse” versions of the same elements or chemical 
compositions.17  While novel properties can be good and indeed 
explain why investments are made to create nanoparticles and 
nanomaterials, what may be a good or benign property in some 
contexts could be risky in others.  In addition, materials that 
have some desirable, selected-for novel properties could have 
other undesirable, not-understood, not-selected-for novel 
properties.  From the perspective of either concern, it is not 
relevant that the molecular identity of a substance at the nano-
scale is identical to that of a bulk substance that has been 
determined by regulators as not posing risks warranting 
regulatory attention.18 
 
 14. Id. at 7. 
 15. See, e.g., Ben Harder, Conduit to the Brain: Particles Enter the Nervous 
System Via The Nose, SCI. NEWS, Jan. 24, 2004, http://www.sciencenews.org/ 
view/generic/id/4660/title/Conduit_to_the_Brain_Particles_enter_the_nervous_s
ystem_via_the_nose.  According to Dr. Denison of Environmental Defense, the 
"surprising results" in these studies of nanoparticles include that "[t]hey can 
cross from the lung, when inhaled, directly into our blood."  Environmental and 
Safety Impacts of Nanotechnology: What Research is Needed?: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Science, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Richard A. Denison, 
Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Environmental Defense). 
 16. JRC REPORT, supra note 13, at 26. 
 17. See id. 
 18. The novelty of behavior at the nanoscale also helps explain why one 
cannot dismiss nanomaterials as posing de minimis risks on the grounds that 
the mass of these materials is so modest as to make them an unproblematic 
addition to human or non-human ecological systems.  At the nanoscale, surface 
area, charge, and reactivity may be much more important than mass. See, e.g., 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/3
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III. THE CURRENT DEFINITION DEBATE 
Recent efforts at defining nanomaterials for regulatory 
purposes in the United States and Europe suggest several 
different choices that regulators face in addressing 
nanomaterials.  These include: 
 Whether to offer a firm definition of nanomaterials as a 
category at all or simply choose not to have a regulatory 
definition for the category; 
 Whether to focus on all substances at the nanoscale or only 
those that are “engineered,” that is, that are not “natural;” 
 Whether to focus solely on an “objective,” physical definition 
of nanomaterial or a “subjective,” functional, novel-
properties-oriented definition; 
 Within the scope of the physical definition, whether to 
contain the scope to the conventional scientific definition of 
1 to 100 nanometers, and whether to extend the definition to 
a material containing any nanoparticle or to limit the 
definition to material containing a threshold amount or 
proportion of nanoparticles; and 
 Whether the definition of nanomaterials should vary by the 
extent and intensity of likely human exposure to the 
materials. 
 
Each of these points of contention, or possible contention, is 
briefly reviewed. 
 
M.E.J. PRONK ET AL., NANOMATERIALS UNDER REACH: NANOSILVER AS A CASE 
STUDY 17 (2009), available at  http://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten 
/601780003.pdf.  Mass-based definitions also are insensitive to context: even a 
very light substance that is so small as to lodge in sensitive parts of the human 
body (such as the brain) that usually block out intruding substances may 
warrant attention.  For these reasons, mass- or volume-based regulatory 
regimes, such as the E.U.’s REACH, unless modified, arguably do not properly 
address nanomaterials.  In the E.U.’s REACH, in the context of bulk industrial 
chemicals, there is an implicit exclusion from registration requirements for any 
chemicals for which less than a ton is produced or imported annually in the E.U.  
Despite its one ton per year threshold, the European Commission since at least 
December 2006 has expressed the view that REACH encompasses materials 
produced at the nano-scale that do not meet that threshold. See Lynn L. 
Bergeson, REACH and Nano (May 23, 2007), http://nanotech.lawbc.com/2007/05/ 
articles/international/reach-and-nano/. 
7
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A. To Define or Not Define 
In practice, many regulatory agencies in the United States 
and elsewhere have chosen not to address nanomaterials as a 
category and hence have avoided the definitional question, 
despite the fact that nanomaterials are an issue that is clearly 
part of the scientific and public policy discourse.  One reason 
agencies may have chosen not to define nanomaterials is that 
their leadership does not believe a definition for the category 
would be useful, at least given the current limited scientific 
understanding of the behavior of nanoscale materials.  Another 
reason may be that business entities are lobbying quietly, or not 
so quietly lobbying, in support of that view.  One commentator 
closely linked to what might be termed the nanotechnology 
industry has suggested this explanation: 
Many government agencies have been reluctant to define terms 
pertinent to this emerging technology in the absence of additional 
data and information recognizing that the consequence of non-
compliance with a regulatory mandate invites monetary and 
other unintended consequences. . . . The reason why many 
regulatory agencies have been reluctant to embrace definitions 
for regulatory purposes is that many believe a one-size-fits-all 
approach is scientifically indefensible and likely to do more harm 
than good.  The debate will continue for some time. In the 
interim, stakeholders need to remain vigilant in monitoring 
global initiatives and try as best as possible to encourage 
regulatory agencies to define no term prematurely or 
inappropriately.  The consequences of a rush to judgment will not 
help advance regulatory goals, may well confuse an already 
muddled area, and compromise the commercialization of a 
promising technology.19 
 The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
come close to advocating a non-definition definition of 
nanomaterials, and hence has placed itself somewhere toward the 
do not define end of the define/do not define debate.  Under FDA’s 
approach, in considering whether a product contains 
 
 19. Lynn L. Bergeson, To Define or Not to Define: The War of Words, 
NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, Sept. 2, 2011, http://www.nanotech-now.com/columns/? 
article=572. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/3
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nanomaterials, the agency will consider both objective physical 
criteria, specifically size, and novel properties associated with 
risks regardless of size.20  However, there is no definitive 
commitment as to what FDA will treat as a nanomaterial or 
product containing nanomaterials.  Thus, according to draft 
guidance: 
When considering whether an FDA-regulated product contains 
nanomaterials or otherwise involves the application of 
nanotechnology, FDA will ask: 1. Whether an engineered 
material or end product has at least one dimension in the 
nanoscale range (approximately 1 nm to 100 nm); or 2. Whether 
an engineered material or end product exhibits properties or 
phenomena, including physical or chemical properties or 
biological effects, that are attributable to its dimension(s), even if 
these dimensions fall outside the nanoscale range, up to one 
micrometer.21 
Consistent with the tentative “when considering” and “will 
ask” language, FDA also affirms that: 
FDA has not to date established regulatory definitions of 
“nanotechnology,” “nanoscale” or related terms. . . . Based on 
FDA’s current scientific and technical understanding of 
nanomaterials and their characteristics, FDA believes that 
evaluations of safety, effectiveness or public health impact of 
such products should consider the unique properties and 
behaviors that nanomaterials may exhibit.22 
 
 20. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., 
CONSIDERING WHETHER AN FDA-REGULATED PRODUCT INVOLVES THE APPLICATION 
OF NANOTECHNOLOGY: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY III(A) (2011), available at  
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm257698.htm. 
 21. Id.; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERV., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SAFETY OF NANOMATERIALS IN COSMETIC 
PRODUCTS II (2012), available at  http://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/Guidance 
ComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/ucm300886.htm 
(adopting same language).  For an approving discussion of the FDA approach, 
see Andrew Maynard, A Nanotechnology Regulation Hat Trick From the US 
Federal Government, 2020 SCIENCE, June 10, 2011, http://2020science.org/2011 
/06/10/a-nanotechnology-regulation-hat-trick-from-the-us-federal-government/. 
 22. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 20, at III. 
9
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The upshot of the FDA approach may be “we know it when we see 
it.”  This approach assumes that regulated entities should and 
will fully consult with the agency to discuss whether a product 
may contain nanomaterials and whether that requires additional 
regulatory review; according to FDA’s Commissioner, “industry 
and developers should keep both of these broad size- and 
property-related factors in mind when considering whether their 
products might fall within FDA’s attention for nanomaterials and 
are encouraged to consult with the agency early in their 
development process to resolve any uncertainties.”23  The 
responsibility for bringing materials to FDA’s attention thus rests 
with business entities that make products subject to FDA 
approval.  (As I suggest below, that assumption of industry 
eagerness to consult of its own accord, on its own initiative, may 
be unrealistic.) 
What is the case for not defining nanomaterials as a 
regulatory category?  The best answer to that question has been 
provided by Andrew Maynard, a leading scholar on the risks 
posed by and regulation of nanotechnology, and a person who 
cannot at all be characterized as simply advocating for industry 
interests.  His argument appears to be that general regulatory 
definitions for nanomaterials may result in both over-regulation 
and under-regulation, and hence a specific regulatory definition 
of nanomaterials is undesirable.24  He believes that many 
nanomaterials, defined by any plausible size criteria, do not all—
or even almost all—pose risks based on the available and evolving 
scientific evidence.25  Thus, any nanomaterials definition will be 
too broad and taint many materials that pose no risk.  
Conversely, any definition of nanomaterials will leave out some 
specific materials where dimension-related effects pose risks.  
Maynard suggests we should not seek to define and regulate 
nanomaterials as such, but take each material and product 
containing nanoscale materials as a unique case within a unique 
context and evaluate that case based on a range of factors that 
the available science suggests may be relevant: 
 
 23. Margaret A. Hamburg, FDA’s Approach to Regulation of Products of 
Nanotechnology, 336 SCIENCE 299 (2012). 
 24. Maynard, supra note 21. 
 25. Id. at 2. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/3
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With policy-makers looking for clear definitions on which to build 
“nano-regulations,” there is a growing danger of science being 
pushed aside. . . . But it is becoming clear that many parameters 
other than size modulate risk, including particle shape, porosity, 
surface area and chemistry. Some of these parameters become 
more relevant at smaller scales—but not always. The transition 
from “conventional” to “unconventional” behaviour, when it does 
occur, depends critically on the particular material and the 
context. A “one size fits all” definition of nanomaterials will fail to 
capture what is important for addressing risk.26 
B. Engineered or Not 
Almost all proposed regulatory definitions of nanoparticles or 
nanomaterials limit the scope of the category to substances that 
are engineered, meaning manufactured, by human effort.  That 
nanomaterials for regulatory purposes be engineered at the 
nanoscale is important for several reasons.  First, because an 
entity is unlikely to engineer something at the nanoscale unless 
the material is expected to have novel properties, engineered 
materials are likely to display novel properties.27  It is precisely 
such materials that implicate the concerns about unusual particle 
behavior that motivate the calls for the development of a 
regulatory framework for nanomaterials.  Materials that are 
produced at a nanoscale inadvertently or by accident, or simply as 
a byproduct of the achievement of a goal unrelated to the 
nanoscale materials, are less likely to be characterized by novel 
properties. 
That said, there are difficulties in tying a regulatory 
definition to a concept of “engineered” because it can be hard to 
know what is precisely meant by the concept, at least in the 
absence of a clear definition.  Does engineered production include 
production where the manufacturer reasonably should have 
known it was creating a nanoscale material but for whatever 
reason did not know?  Does intentional production, for example, 
 
 26. Andrew Maynard, Don’t Define Nanomaterials, 475 NATURE 31 (2011) 
(Maynard had previously advocated for the regulatory definition of 
nanomaterials). 
 27. DAVID A. DANA, THE NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE: CREATING LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS FOR UNCERTAIN RISKS 112 (2012). 
11
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include the production of a nanoscale material that is an 
incidental byproduct of the production of another non-nanoscale 
material if the manufacturer is in fact aware of the byproduct and 
its nanoscale dimensions?28 
These difficulties in defining what engineered means could 
explain why, in contrast to other regulatory authorities, the 
European Commission has excluded “engineered” or even 
“intentionally produced” from its proposed definition of 
nanomaterials.29  According to the European Commission’s 
recommendation, its definition of nanomaterials “covers natural, 
incidental or manufactured materials.”30 
C. “Objective” Physical or Subjective “Functional” 
 Criteria or Both? 
Assuming that an agency accepts the need to define 
nanomaterials as a distinct category, and even assuming it limits 
that category to engineered materials, there remains the question 
of what criteria will be used to distinguish nanomaterials from all 
other materials.  One difference in proposed definitions has to do 
with whether the definition should track physical criteria that in 
theory might be specifically measurable and hence, in a limited 
sense, objective.  Size is the most obvious such criteria, and so far 
the only one included in any of the proposed definitions.31  The 
 
 28. There is a strong case for carving out an exception to the regulatory 
definition for nanomaterials for those materials that were in production and use 
long before the last twenty years and the emergence of nanotechnology as a 
distinct field.  For these historically-produced and long-used materials, there is 
no reason–and indeed no suggestion by anyone in the literature–that such 
materials pose possible environmental, health, or safety risks.  These historical 
materials include carbon black and a variety of materials used in food 
production, including the production of homogenized milk and mayonnaise.  
Although some or all of these materials might be excluded by a definition of 
nanomaterials that requires that nanomaterials have been “engineered,” as the 
JRC Report suggests that is not obviously the case; so an explicit exclusion for 
materials produced prior to a plausible date (e.g. 1980 or 1990) might be 
preferable. JRC REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.2.6. 
 29. Cf. Definition of Nanomaterial, supra note 1. 
 30. Id. The Danish Ministry of Environment definition also includes no 
reference to the concepts of intentionality/engineered/manufactured, although 
even that definition suggests that nanomaterials must be “produced” or “made” 
as opposed to being naturally occurring.  JRC REPORT, supra note 13, at 3.3.3. 
 31. See Definition of Nanomaterial, supra note 1. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/3
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alternative to the objective, physical approach would be an 
approach that defines nanomaterials based on whether or how 
much they exhibit novel properties associated with having one or 
more nano dimensions.  This “novel properties” approach might 
be regarded as more subjective because it is, to an extent, 
subjective what constitutes a “novel” property in any particular 
case.  As one commentator explained: 
While the “novel properties” concept rests at the center of world-
wide interest in nanotechnology, it also presents materials 
characterization and regulatory problems. What exactly are these 
“novel properties,” how are they defined, are they consistent from 
one type of nanomaterial to the next, do they vary in intensity 
under certain circumstances, and are they measurable and 
capable of standardization? If not, how are we going to handle 
this aspect of the definition when it comes to materials 
characterization projects and/or regulations? Scientists–not 
lawyers–will have to answer these questions, of course.32 
This subjectivity could allow manufacturers to plausibly claim 
that they did not know certain materials qualify as 
nanomaterials, and hence could allow them to refrain from 
disclosing those materials to regulators.  The possibility of 
nondisclosure on the part of manufacturers is heightened by the 
fact that the subjective approach also requires a great deal of 
information about the material—information about how the 
material “behaves” in different contexts—that most often is 
unavailable to regulators and the broader public.  Conversely, 
subjectivity creates the possibility that manufacturers will lack 
the notice they deserve ex ante, when they are developing 
materials and/or products, that they will be subject to the 
regulatory definition of nanomaterials and any attendant 
regulatory requirements. 
The attraction of a subjective approach is that it ties the 
definition more closely to a main source of risks associated with 
the nanoscale, that is, that otherwise benign materials may 
behave in novel ways that require regulatory consideration when 
those materials are configured at the nanoscale.  Because novel 
 
 32. John C. Monica, Jr., “Novel Properties” Dilemma, NANO L. REP., Mar. 6, 
2007, http://www.nanolaw report.com/2007/03/#axzz2IitL7abh. 
13
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properties are directly tied to one of the main reasons we believe 
nanomaterials may pose risks to human health and the 
environment, a definition that directly references novel properties 
might be thought to be more functionally related to the animating 
goals of defining nanomaterials and, in that sense, less 
mechanical and more sophisticated than the objective, physical 
approach. 
We observe two approaches in proposed regulatory 
definitions of nanomaterials.  In one approach, only objective, 
physical criteria are referenced.  This is the approach most 
definitive of the European Commission, which has expressly 
recommended that only size be considered in defining what is a 
nanomaterial.33  In a proposal regarding nanomaterials in 
pesticides under FIFRA, EPA opted for an objective, physical 
approach, explaining that, in its view, relying on “novel 
properties” in the context of a regulatory definition was 
unworkable: 
These elements[, novel properties and unconventional behavior of 
materials,] do not readily work in a regulatory context because of 
the high degree of subjectivity involved with interpreting such 
phrases as “unique or novel properties” or “manufactured or 
engineered to take advantage of these properties.”  Moreover, the 
contribution of these subjective elements to risk has not been 
established.  Instead, OPP will focus on more objective criteria in 
describing when information about a “nanoscale material” in a 
pesticide product may be relevant to determining whether the 
product has an unreasonable adverse environmental effect.  
Specifically, such information may be relevant in this context 
when the active or inert ingredient and any component parts 
thereof is intentionally produced to have at least one dimension 
that measures between approximately 1 and 100 nanometers, 
regardless of the aggregation or agglomeration state of the final 
material.34 
 
 33. Definition of Nanomaterial, supra note 1. 
 34. Policies Concerning Products Containing Nanoscale Materials, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 35383-01, 35387 (proposed June 17, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).  
In October 2010, EPA submitted a proposed TSCA revision to OMB that also 
reportedly follows an objective, physical approach.  Under this proposal, any 
chemical substance from 1 to 100 nanometers will be subject to TSCA’s 
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In the second approach, there is an objective, physical definition 
of nanomaterial and then a second, subjective, functional 
definition that applies even when the objective, physical criteria 
are inapplicable.35  This approach, a kind of catch-all approach, is 
what Canada’s regulators have proposed.  According to the 
Canadian definition, any manufactured substance or product and 
any component material, ingredient, device, or structure is a 
nanomaterial if “[i]t is at or within the nanoscale in at least one 
external dimension [1 to 100 nanometers]” or “[i]t is smaller or 
larger than the nanoscale in all dimensions and exhibits one or 
more nanoscale properties/phenomena,” where “nanoscale 
properties/phenomena” “means properties which are attributable 
to size and their effects,” and that “are distinguishable from the 
chemical or physical properties of individual atoms, individual 
molecules and bulk material. . . .”36  Although this definition 
employs “nanoscale properties” instead of novel properties, it 
raises the same question of subjectivity, that is, is there and can 
there be a firm guide telling a manufacturer in a specific case 
whether its material has or does not have a nanoscale property? 
In theory, one could imagine a third approach—one in which 
nanomaterials are solely defined by whether they exhibit novel 
properties associated with dimension or size, regardless of their 
actual size.  Some might think such a subjective, although 
appealingly functional, approach would be unworkable, for 
reasons already suggested; and indeed one might argue that in 
practice this approach would mean no actual definition of 
nanomaterials as a distinct category.  While no agency has 
proposed this approach, a Whitehouse/OMB guidance document 
comes close to suggesting as much: “[f]or oversight and regulation 
. . . the critical issue is whether and how . . . altered properties 
 
Significant New Use Rule (SNUR).  “This regulatory revision treats the 
nanomaterial as a new chemical and requires submission of data to EPA at least 
90 days prior to commencing manufacture of these types of materials.” U.S. 
EPA, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA NEEDS TO MANAGE NANOMATERIAL RISKS 
MORE EFFECTIVELY: REP. NO. 12-P-0162, 4 (2011), available at  
http://www.epa.gov/oig/ reports/2012/20121229-12-P-0162.pdf. 
 35. See HEALTH CANADA, POLICY STATEMENT ON HEALTH CANADA’S WORKING 
DEFINITION FOR NANOMATERIAL (2011), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/sr-
sr/pubs/nano/ pol-eng.php. 
 36. Id. 
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and phenomena emerging at the nanoscale create or alter the 
risks and benefits of a specific application,” and thus “[a] focus on 
novel properties and phenomena observed in nanomaterials may 
ultimately be more useful than a categorical definition based on 
size alone.”37 
D. How Small and How Many Particles 
The final debate among the proposed regulatory definitions of 
nanomaterials has to do with the exact specifications for size 
criteria.  As already noted, one dimension of 1 to 100 nanometers 
in length is a conventional scientific definition of the nanoscale, 
and almost all proposed regulatory definitions incorporate that 
scale.  However, a few proposed definitions contemplate a scale of 
up to 1,000 nanometers.38  There would appear to be no inherent 
significance in 100 nanometers as a defining upper limit, but it is 
not obvious that there is anything inherently significant about 
the largest upper figure that has been suggested, 1,000 
nanometers, either.  There is some suggestion in the literature 
that we see the most novel properties at a scale well below 100 
nanometers,39 but an essential truth of this whole area is that 
there is a great deal unknown, and there is a great deal of 
 
 37. JOHN P. HOLDEN ET AL., POLICY PRINCIPLES IN THE U.S. DECISION-MAKING 
CONCERNING REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT OF APPLICATIONS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 
AND NANOMATERIALS (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/omb/inforeg/for-/nanotechnology-regulation-and-oversight 
principles.pdf. 
 38. The JCR Report suggests an upper limit of 1,000 nm.  The National 
Organics Standards Board Materials Committee, convened under the authority 
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, in a recent statement (February 25, 
2010) has suggested an upper limit of 300 nm.  In 2010, the U.K. House of Lords 
Science and Technology Committee suggested 1,000 nm. SCI. & TECH. COMM., 
NANOTECHNOLOGIES AND FOOD, 2010, H.L. 22-I, ¶ 5(24) (U.K.).  The California 
Safer Consumer Product Alternatives Act similarly proposes a nanoscale 
between 1-1,000 nanometers.  For a discussion of the arguments and 
suggestions for a 1,000 upper threshold, see CANADA ENVTL. LAW ASS’N, 
RESPONSE TO INTERIM STATEMENT ON HEALTH: CANADA’S WORKING DEFINITION 
FOR NANOMATERIALS 8-9 (2010), available at http://www.cela.ca/publications/ 
response-interim-policy-statement-nano materials. 
 39. Mélanie Auffan et al., Toward a Definition of Inorganic Nanoparticles 
From an Environmental, Health and Safety Perspective, 4 NATURE 
NANOTECHNOLOGY 634 (2009). 
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diversity and difference among particles and materials even of 
the same rough size. 
A related debate is whether “nanomaterials” should include 
any material that includes any nanoparticle or only materials 
including some percentage of nanoparticles.  Many substances 
contain particles of a range of sizes, some of which are arguably 
“nano,” and many of which are not.  Most of the proposed 
regulatory definitions to date seem to suggest that a material or 
substance containing any nanoparticle is itself a nanomaterial, 
but the European Commission recommends that a material be 
classified as a nanomaterial only if fifty percent or more of its 
particles are nanoscale.40  But even the Commission qualifies this 
limitation by providing that a threshold lower than fifty percent 
may be appropriate on a case-by-case basis.41 
E. Likely Exposure As Part of The Definitions 
Regulators may never know exactly how dangerous or not 
dangerous any given nanomaterial (however defined) may be for 
human beings who come into contact with the material.  But even 
for materials where there is genuine uncertainty as to how the 
substance will behave, it may be possible to at least estimate how 
many people could be adversely affected assuming, on a 
precautionary basis, that the material can adversely affect 
human health.  Some nanomaterials are and will be used in food 
or toothpaste or nasal sprays, all of which involve intense human 
exposure to potentially millions of people, including vulnerable 
populations.  Other materials will be used in (for example) tennis 
rackets and tires, both of which involve less intense human 
exposure, and still others will be used in medical treatments that 
are designed for use on only a few hundred people per year.  From 
a precautionary perspective, in the face of uncertainty about each 
particular material, it might make sense to define nanomaterials 
more expansively in realms where intense, mass human exposure 
is very likely and less expansively where that is less likely.  Thus, 
 
 40. Definition of Nanomaterial, supra note 1. 
 41. Id. (“In specific cases and where warranted by concerns for the 
environment, health, safety or competitiveness the number size distribution 
threshold of 50% may be replaced by a threshold between 1 and 50%.”). 
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it might make sense for the definition of nanomaterials for foods 
regulated by the FDA and pesticides regulated under FIFRA to 
extend up to 1,000 nanometers. 
By contrast, when a material is not being produced for use in 
a mass market product and/or is intended only for use in an 
arena of relatively limited and controlled human exposure, there 
may be an argument for the application of a de minimis risk-
based exclusion from an otherwise applicable regulatory 
definition of nanomaterials.  A nanomaterial that is being 
produced in very tiny amounts for use in the construction of 
equipment for outer space, for example, could fall in such a de 
minimis exception. 
However, there are considerable operational difficulties in 
implementing an approach that provides for an expansive 
regulatory definition based on likely scope of human exposure or 
that allows for a de minimis exception based on very limited 
likely exposure.  For one thing, a material that is initially not 
intended for mass marketing or human consumption could be re-
directed to such uses at a later date; moreover, materials can 
come into close human contact through the process of disposal 
and subsequent absorption into the environment (e.g., via 
leaching into a drinking water supply).42  There are many 
possible pathways of exposure with nanomaterials, and there 
may be no way to trace pathways in the environment because of 
the lack of technology to identify and track such small materials. 
A proliferation of different definitions of nanomaterials based 
on likely exposure scenarios also works against facilitating 
communication and coordination as among different agencies and 
offices.  At the same time, the fact that most attention to 
regulatory definitions of nanomaterials to date has centered 
around food, the food chain, and cosmetics implicitly affirms the 
view that likelihood of mass human exposure is a highly relevant 
variable.43 
 
 42. U.S. EPA, supra note 34, at 2 (“there also exists the potential for 
exposures to nanomaterials during product manufacturing, use and/or at the 
end of the product life cycle through recycling, landfills, and waste 
incineration.”). 
 43. The Whitehouse/OMB guidance seems to suggest incorporating exposure 
scenarios into regulatory definitions, however. See HOLDEN ET AL., supra note 37.  
In other work, I argue that exposure should factor in regulatory definition. See 
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IV. A REGULATORY DEFINITION IS NECESSARY 
Before addressing what kind of definition agencies should 
adopt for nanomaterials, it is important first to explain why 
definitions are necessary and not, as Maynard argues, 
counterproductive.  Maynard is right that any regulatory 
definition or definitions of nanomaterials will include some 
materials that pose real risk and others that do not.  But that is 
not a reason to avoid regulatory definitions of nanomaterials 
because defining is the first, not the last, step in a process of 
considering what regulatory requirements should apply.  An 
agency could define a universe of (say) 10,000 nanomaterials and 
then proceed to identify only 1,000 that warrant testing or 
additional testing, and then based on that testing, apply labeling 
or warning requirements to only a handful of the original 10,000. 
Maynard seems to suggest that once materials receive 
designation as nanomaterials, they will acquire a taint in the 
public imagination, and substantive and perhaps unreasonable 
regulation of all of them will follow as a political and social 
imperative.44  But the opposite is likely true.  Public concern 
about nanotechnology and nanomaterials is likely to be assuaged 
if the public (and in particular relevant NGOs that help shape 
public opinion) have reason to think that agencies are taking a 
close look at nanotechnology and nanomaterials, even if that 
means the agencies’ close look in most cases results in no further 
action.  And the public may not credit agencies as taking a close 
look if agencies lack even a definition of nanomaterials.  Indeed, 
it is hard to see how not defining nanomaterials will increase 
public trust that the government is addressing present and 
potential risks posed by nanomaterials.45 
Maynard also suggests that regulatory definitions of 
nanomaterials might result in regulators not taking a close look 
 
THE NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE: CREATING LEGAL INSTITUTIONS FOR 
UNCERTAIN RISKS (David A. Dana ed., 2012). 
 44. Maynard, supra note 26. 
 45. See Jeremy Warren, The EU Definition of Nanomaterials – Getting What 
You Wished For, LABORATORY NEWS, June 12, 2012, http://www.labnews.co.uk/ 
features/eu-definition-nanomaterials-%E2%80%93-wished-for/ (“To gain trust 
nanotechnology needs a regulatory framework – but before this can happen we 
need to know one thing – just what is a nanomaterial.”). 
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at substances or materials outside the definition.46  This point, 
however, is better formulated as a critique of too narrow or 
inflexible a definition of nanomaterials than as support for having 
no definition at all.  Moreover, any regulatory effort at 
ascertaining risk and response has to start somewhere and 
cannot start everywhere; defining nanomaterials, even defining 
them inflexibly by size or largely by size, may be a reasonable 
starting point and lay the ground for exploration of risks posed by 
materials that are too large or otherwise fall outside the 
definition.  We see exactly that in the arena of particulate matter 
emissions, where EPA has moved beyond regulation of larger 
particulate matter to include smaller or fine particulate matter, 
as the agency learned more about these emissions. 
The need for regulatory definitions is also related to the need 
to facilitate communication and learning within an agency and 
among agencies.  A working definition helps an agency or 
agencies identify and build bridges among staff working on issues 
or with regard to materials that implicate the nanoscale.  
Because there are in fact some common issues and potential for 
shared learning about the nanoscale, such identification is 
important.  Indeed, one of the EPA Inspector General’s (I.G.) 
criticisms of the agency’s nanotechnology/nanomaterials efforts to 
date is that there has been a lack of coordination and sharing of 
information.47  As the I.G. Report explained: 
EPA does not have an Agency-wide, formal process to 
disseminate manufacturer data. . . . [I]nformation sharing is not 
facilitated by a formal process; rather, it depends on personal 
relationships between program staff. . . . Coordinated sharing of 
nanomaterial data call information will also be important if 
additional regulatory actions become necessary. . . . Because of 
the growing number of nanomaterial products entering the 
marketplace . . . it will become increasingly necessary for these 
program offices to share information and coordinate their 
efforts.48 
 
 46. Maynard, supra note 26. 
 47. U.S. EPA, supra note 34, at 9. 
 48. Id. at 9-10. 
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Having clear regulatory definitions of nanomaterials cannot 
create coordination and information-sharing, but it seems 
reasonable to assume it can help.  The larger point is that 
definitions are always imperfect but they nonetheless are 
important for establishing a discourse. 
A. Agency Definitions Should Be Information-Forcing 
That agencies are not operating in some idealized space with 
respect to nanomaterials was underscored by the recent EPA 
Inspector General report: 
At the time of our review, EPA did not have sufficient 
information or processes to effectively manage the human health 
and environmental risks of nanomaterials. EPA does not have a 
formal process to coordinate the dissemination and utilization of 
nanomaterial information or communicate nanomaterial risks. . . 
.  [T]echnological limitations inhibit nanomaterial detection in 
the environment, and a reliance on industry data impedes 
effective nanomaterial management.49 
Regulators do not even have a ready way of knowing what 
nanomaterials or arguable nanomaterials are being produced 
and/or how they are being deployed.50  Nanoparticles are not 
readily visible, and they are not typically listed as distinct 
ingredients even on packaged consumer products.51  Moreover, 
even when regulators have some idea of the components of a 
given product, they may have very little information with which 
to assess and evaluate those components, given the newness and 
complexity of nanotechnology.  Further, because there are an 
almost infinite variety of any nanoscale materials and because 
the nanotechnology industry and nanoscale materials are fast 
evolving, it may be impossible for even the most heroic of 
 
 49. Id. at 9. 
 50. Robin Wilson, Nanotechnology: The Challenge of Regulating Known 
Unknowns, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 704, 707 (2006).  
 51. Nanoparticles Found in 10 Top Brand Cosmetics, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, 
http://nano.foe.org.au/nanoparticles-found-10-top-brand-cosmetics (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2012). 
21
 462 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
regulators to keep up.52  Regulators on their own, without the 
assistance of industry, cannot have the information they need to 
grasp the current state of play in nanotechnology. 
The relevant question then is how can agency definitions of 
“nanomaterials” be structured so as to maximize the amount of 
relevant information they receive regarding nanomaterials and 
the possible risks and risks posed by nanomaterials?  Given the 
lack of information on the part of regulators regarding 
nanomaterials, regulatory definitions cannot describe the 
contours of risks but rather must be a means of generating the 
information needed to assess the contours of risks. 
This question calls for a distinction between two kinds of 
information.  The first is information that industry has or can 
readily obtain regarding nanoscale materials it is making or 
using, such as the size of those materials or their chemical 
identity.  The second is information that would require industry 
to make some significant investment to generate information 
regarding these materials that could be helpful to an 
understanding of the risks posed by or not posed by such 
materials.  The latter category, in many cases, will include 
precise assessments of the novelty of behavior of the 
nanomaterials in relevant contexts, which itself may require tests 
for effects on human health and the environment.  While some 
companies may perform such testing in the absence of specific 
regulatory requirements, there are good reasons to postulate that 
many companies do not. 
Industry has no strong and consistent incentive to 
voluntarily provide regulators with all the relevant information it 
possesses.  Doing so, industry understands, can lead to costly new 
requirements or even product prohibitions.  That may explain 
why so little information appears to have been produced in 
response to EPA’s Voluntary Stewardship program for 
nanomaterials.53  And, outside the context of nanomaterials, 
 
 52. Nanotechnology Market Forecast to 2014, MARKET WATCH (Oct. 22, 2012, 
9:11 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nanotechnology-market-forecast-
to-2014-2012-10-22. 
 53. See EPA’s Voluntary Reporting Program Fails To Deliver Data Needed To 
Determine Safety Of Nanomaterials, Report Shows, ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND (Jan. 
13, 2009), http://www.edf.org/news/epas-voluntary-reporting-program-fails-
deliver-data-needed-determine-safety-nanomaterials-repor (explaining that EPA 
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there is not a long history or clear record of industry actors 
making voluntary disclosures to regulators: tobacco companies 
certainly did not disclose the information they had that was 
relevant to links to cancer until they absolutely were required to 
do so.  Thus, although the FDA apparently contemplates 
producers of FDA-regulated products to consult with them in an 
ongoing and volitional way about nanoscale components in their 
products, there are reasons to question whether businesses will 
initiate such consultations in the FDA context.  Voluntary 
consultation, moreover, seems even more unlikely in contexts 
where businesses know they are subject to less precautionary 
statutory and regulatory authorities than those under which the 
FDA operates. 
Moreover, industry not only has incentives not to offer up 
information to regulators it has or could readily obtain, it also has 
reasons not to invest in developing additional information that 
would be relevant to risk assessments by regulators.54  There are 
strong incentives for industry not to know about potentially risky 
aspects of the materials and/or products they make.  Knowing 
about risk requires a research investment by industry, and any 
one company that makes that investment is assuming higher 
costs than its competitors who avoid those costs.  Moreover, the 
investment may only result in greater tort liability down the 
road, as well as regulatory penalties for knowingly engaging in 
dangerous conduct.55  Ignorance, in other words, is sometimes 
and perhaps many times rational. 
Ideally, a regulatory definition would do two things.  First, it 
would effectively compel industry to disclose the information it 
already has regarding a set of materials at issue.  Second, the 
definition would combat the phenomenon of intentional industry 
 
has acknowledged that its voluntary approach has yielded “only limited 
information on a small fraction of the hundreds of potentially toxic 
nanomaterials”). 
 54. See Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of 
Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the 
Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1670-77 (2004); see also Wendy E. Wagner, 
When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 
GEO. L.J. 693, 693-95 (2007). 
 55. See David A. Dana, When Less Liability May Mean More Precaution: The 
Case of Nanomaterials, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 153, 170 (2010). 
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ignorance by providing an incentive for industry to generate 
additional relevant information and to share that information 
with regulators. 
Regulatory definitions that do not contain relatively objective 
criteria, such as particle size, and that instead only track whether 
a material was engineered to behave in “novel” ways, may well 
not meet these objectives.  Flexible, subjective, functional 
definitions of nanomaterials tied to whether a material displays 
novel properties related to size leave enough room for industry 
not to disclose what it knows to regulators because what is 
covered under such definitions is contestable.  “Wiggle room” will 
result in the avoidance of disclosure.  EPA’s recent endorsement 
of objective criteria, from the perspective of the realities of 
behavior on the part of regulated entities (at least in the United 
States context), makes sense.  Functional, subjective definitions 
work best under assumptions of eager compliance and openness 
that have little grounding in actual practice. 
At the same time, objective definitions tied to size or other 
similar criteria, while likely to produce information regarding 
which products contain nanomaterials based on these criteria, are 
not likely by themselves to encourage industry to disclose what it 
knows about subjective matters such as “novel properties” or to 
invest in obtaining more information about novel properties.  
Industry needs an incentive to provide and generate information 
that otherwise would offer them no benefit. 
One way to incentivize the production and disclosure of such 
information would be to add to the definition of nanomaterials a 
provision whereby materials that would be included under a size 
criteria could be excluded if industry could demonstrate both that 
(1) the material, despite its small size, will not be deployed in a 
context where the size itself could cause harm, and (2) the 
material is not characterized by novel properties that could result 
in human health or ecological harm.  By rewarding industry with 
exclusion from the realm of regulatory definitions and possible 
attendant regulatory costs, a definition of nanomaterials similar 
to the aforementioned one can address the disincentives for 
industry research that are a central problem in regulation.  Even 
if only some industry participants choose to engage in such a 
dialogue with regulators, regulators could learn a great deal 
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about nanotechnology and novel properties that they could apply 
broadly to their regulatory efforts.56 
B. Regulatory Definitions Must Take Account of 
 Information Staleness 
The whole enterprise of regulating nanotechnology—and 
hence the included enterprise of defining nanomaterials for 
regulatory purposes—ideally would be an exercise in “adaptive 
management,” or management that continually adapts to take 
account of new information and new insights.  It is easy to call for 
adaptive management; no one supports non-adaptive 
management.  But adaptive management always should be 
understood as a goal that requires specific encouragement and 
support.  Regulated entities need some stability to operate, and 
stability means some periods of relative non-adaptation; and 
regulators, perpetually overworked and overburdened, and at 
least somewhat removed from developments in science and 
industry, may not engage in even periodic adaptation unless 
institutional structures are in place to encourage them to do so.57  
Just as industry must be encouraged to provide and generate 
information, regulators must be encouraged to seek out and take 
account of new information on an ongoing basis and use that new 
information to inform regulatory definitions as well as 
substantive regulatory requirements. 
One institutional means of achieving this goal would be an 
agency commitment, ideally formalized in an agency regulation, 
to issue a review of its regulatory definition no less than once 
every five years, and in which the agency would be required to 
explain why it was or was not changing the current regulatory 
definition at a minimum of five year intervals.  The process of 
putting out such a review for notice and comment would help 
 
 56. Participation by a few companies might prompt broader participation 
because companies would not want the information provided by participants 
used against them and their products, and would prefer to have a more active 
role in shaping the factual conclusions drawn by the agency.  They also might 
not want to appear less cooperative than other participants. 
 57. On regulatory inertia, see David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, 
Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory 
Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1826 (2008). 
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focus debate on developments in nanotechnology that might 
justify changes in the regulatory definition of nanomaterials.58 
Another way of achieving ongoing adaptation would be to 
allow citizens and regulated entities at any time to petition an 
agency to include a material or exclude a material, and the 
agency could be required to respond to such petitions within a 
reasonable time.  While an allowance for petitions carries with it 
the risk that scarce agency resources will be absorbed by petitions 
instead of potentially more important tasks, in terms of health 
and the environment, an allowance for petitions fosters the 
generation of more data and serves the important values of public 
participation and transparency.59 
One other possible institutional means of achieving ongoing 
adaptation would be the creation of an advisory board to inform 
an agency regarding relevant changes in the nanotechnology 
industry.  If the advisory board was composed of industry, 
academic, and NGO representatives, as might be highly desirable 
to maximize both informational inputs and enhance public 
participation, one issue would be whether such an advisory board 
could achieve a consensus.  Another issue would be whether the 
advisory board’s recommendations would have any influence on 
the agency.  If the agency were required to review regulatory 
definitions every five years and explain why changes were not 
needed, the advisory board could be called on to participate in the 
review process as part of the governing procedures and the 
agency would thus be required to account for the input of the 
advisory board. 
C. The Value of Information Production is Undermined 
 by Excessive Confidentiality Restrictions 
An information-forcing regulatory definition of 
nanomaterials, and institutional mechanisms to encourage 
 
 58. The Clean Air Act has provisions that operate in this way. See 42 U.S.C 
§§ 7408, 7409, 7429 (2012). 
 59. See generally Jennifer Kuzma et al., Evaluating Oversight Systems for 
Emerging Technology: A Case Study of Genetically Engineered Organisms, 37 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 546 (2009) (discussing the link between components of the 
system of regulatory oversight and public confidence regarding emerging 
technologies). 
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ongoing collection of information and reformulation of the 
regulatory definition, only work if agencies use the information 
they receive to the greatest effect.  The designation of information 
received by an agency as confidential business information works 
against that objective in two ways.  First, the designations make 
it more difficult for the agency to obtain both internal, and even 
more so, external assessments of the significance of the 
information.  Second, and relatedly, the designations make it 
difficult for external stakeholders to confirm that the agency is 
doing its job in the ways it should, and not ignoring risks due to 
negligence or undue external pressure.  If external stakeholders 
cannot review the data an agency has obtained, the stakeholders 
cannot provide nearly as useful input as otherwise would be 
possible, and cannot provide meaningful critiques of the agency 
that might prompt action.  Under current practice at EPA under 
TSCA, industry designations of information as confidential 
business information have been taken entirely at face value.  The 
submitting company need not explain why it is claiming the 
designation or provide reasons why the designation is 
appropriate.60  The result, by all accounts, is a massive over-
claiming of the confidential business information designation.61  
While this is not a problem in any way limited to nanomaterials, 
nanomaterials are a good place to start in rectifying it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The debate over defining nanomaterials for regulatory 
purposes centers on the basic issue of whether a definition is 
 
 60. See U.S. EPA, supra note 34, at 5-6 (explaining that the TSCA program, 
under which EPA plans to regulate nanomaterials, is “limited by . . . claims of 
confidential business information (CBI) on industry data submissions . . . up to 
90 percent of TSCA premanufacture notices contain claims of CBI. Excessive 
CBI designations inhibit independent peer reviews, oversight by external 
parties, and information sharing across EPA offices.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Assessing the Effectiveness of U.S. Chemical Safety Laws: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works S. Comm. on Superfund, 
Toxics & Envtl. Health, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Frances Beinecke, 
President, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.) (“TSCA’s Confidential 
Business Information (CBI) provisions . . . allows [sic] companies to make nearly 
unlimited claims of CBI, without requiring any upfront justification or EPA 
review, and without any date of expiration or requirement for periodic renewal 
and justification of such claims.”). 
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advisable or not, and whether any such definition should be based 
on relatively objective physical criteria or more subjective 
functional ones.  This Article argues that a definition is 
necessary, and that the definition or definitions should be 
information-forcing.  The definition should be structured so as to 
require and encourage industry to generate and disclose relevant 
information.  The relevant regulatory or statutory provisions 
should also encourage regulators to continue to seek and evaluate 
new information and use that information to update the 
regulatory definitions.  This approach requires that the 
regulatory definition include relatively objective physical criteria, 
but would also provide for the exclusions from or additions to the 
category of nanomaterials based on functional considerations. 
Getting regulatory definitions right is a key step in creating 
an effective regulatory framework for assessing and managing 
the risks posed by nanomaterials, which in turn is essential to 
realizing the maximum social benefit of the nanotechnology 
revolution. 
 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/3
